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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Body Corporate
and Politic of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff, Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant,
vs.
GRAND COUNTY, a Body Corporate
and Politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant, Appellant and
Cross-Respondent

I
I

No.
9563

Brief of Respondent and Cross Appellant

NATURE OF THE CASE
Grand and San Juan Counties eacl) petitioned the Utah
State Engineer to survey and monument Parallel 38° 30' North
Latitude as the common county boundary to said counties, and
the Utah State Engineer having had the said boundary located
on the ground by enlarged Reconnaissance Survey, Grand
County refused to accept the statutory boundary, refused to
participate in the final marking of the boundary, announced
Grand County would continue to exercise jurisdiction to a

1
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township line 3500 feet south of the statutory boundary line
until a court otherwise decreed. This action was brought by
San Juan County to have the court determine the lawful
boundary line between San Juan County and Grand County
and direct Grand County to abide by that line as and when
surveyed and monumented by the State Engineer.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Though the District Court by Findings of Fact determined
the boundary to be Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude, as defined
by statute, it refused to grant judgment to either plaintiff San
Juan County on its complaint, or to defendant Grand County
on its counterclaim, asserting the District Court had no jurisdiction in the matter.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL
San Juan County seeks to have this Court affirm the
judgment of dismissal of the counterclaim of Grand County.
On its cross-appeal, San Juan County asks for reversal of the
judgment dismissing the complaint and the assessment of costs
against San Juan County for the reason that the trial court
erred in deciding it had no jurisdiction. In addition San
Juan County asks this Honorable Court to enter judgment in
accordance with Findings of Fact 1, 2 and 3 that the common
boundary line between the two counties, and the line to be
surveyed and monumented by the State Engineer of Utah, was
and is Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude, and that such boundary
line has never been changed.

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
San Juan County is unable to agree with the Statement
of Facts contained in appellant's brief for the reason that
Grand County omits a number of decisive facts and states as
facts contentions of Grand County for which there is no proof.
Defendant Grand County inaccurately infers that it has
exclusively levied and collected taxes and exercised exclusive
jurisdicton over all property and governmental services in what
it refers to as the "disputed area."
The "disputed area" varies in width but is approximately
3500 feet in width and extends from the Green River on the
west to the Colorado line on the east, a distance of approximately 54 miles, and includes an area of 22,909.1 acres, or
34 square miles. Properties to be taxed in the "disputed area"
consist of fee lands and properties and easements of utilities
such as Mountain States Telephone Company, Utah Power &
Light Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Midland
Telephone Company, motor carriers, such as Ashworth Transfer, W. S. Hatch, bus companies and others (Tr. 98).
There are also public roads through the "disputed area"
which have been and continue to be maintained at the expense
of San Juan County.
Facts omitted from the Brief of Appellant Grand County,
and facts which should be more accurately stated, are as follows:

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TAXATION IN DISPUTED AREA
The only lands taxed by Grand County in the disputed
area are in two narrow strips of arable lands extending south
from Moab. The acreage taxed varied from 160 acres in 1900
to approximately 600 acres in 1960; which was owned by never
more than seven different people (Ex. 163). The greatest
acreage taxed was 1010 acres in 1941, which produced $179.18
in taxes. Most of the lands in the disputed area are public
domain.
All utilities were assessed on their properties in the disputed area and paid such tax to San Juan County. Significant
amounts are represented in the taxes on these utilities. Though
the figures are for the county as a whole, Utah Power & Light
Company paid San Juan County in taxes for 1956, $5,666.03,
J.ncluding the pro rata for property in the disputed area. In
1959 this figure was $9,301.25. Likewise Pacific Northwest
Pipeline in 1956, for all its property in San Juan County, including that in the disputed area, paid taxes to San Juan
County of $38,201.92, and in 1959, $41,177.54 (Tr. 300).
The personal property of the Geyser Sawmill Lumber
Company located in the disputed area had been taxed and
taxes collected by San Juan County (Tr. 301).
All personal properties of common carriers which traverse
San Juan and Grand Counties are taxed and the taxes divided
between. the two counties on the basis of mileage traveled in
each, with the computation made on the basis of the common
boundary being at a point 3500 feet north of the south line
of Township 26 South, Range 23 East (Tr. 97-100; Ex. 83).
San Juan County received all these taxes for the disputed area.

4
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JURISDICTION OVER ROADS IN DISPUTED AREA
The State of Utah by statute has created for the benefit~.
of counties what is designated as the Class "B" road funds,
which are allocated among the counties on the basis of the
mileage of qualifying roads within the boundaries of the
counties concerned. Exhibit 103 and the testimony of Dale
Burninghahm of the State Road Commission (Tr. 238) establishes that the State of Utah, in allocating and paying the
Class "B" road fund for San Juan County, included as mileage
for computing San Juan County "B road funds" all qualifying
roads within the disputed area.
Exhibit 104 is one of several resolutions which periodically
have been adopted by the defendant Grand County Board of
County Commissioners, approving the allocation of Class "B"
road funds on the basis of the county boundary line being at
a point 3500 feet north of the south line of Township 26
South, Range 22 East.
As several of the roads in the disputed area dead-end at
various view points and are reached from points in Grand
County, Exhibits 114 and 115 represent the written agreement
entered into between plaintiff and defendant counties, pursuant
to which Grand County maintained the portion of the road
in the disputed area for San Juan County and charged San Juan
County for the cost of maintaining San Juan County roads in
the disputed area. Exhibits 20, 112 and 116 show the payment
of funds by San Juan County to Grand County in accordance
with this agreement.

5
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RECOGNITION BY PROPERTY OWNERS
Exhibits 167 and 168 were received in evidence (Tr. 492)
and represent 716 pages of documents affecting property in
the disputed area that have been filed of record in San Juan
County. The dates of these documents are generally from 1952
to 1960, conforming with the uranium activity and more
recently the potash leases and discoveries. These instruments
are mining locations, states leases and federal leases, and are
not assessed by the county but are to be assesse~ for taxes by
the Utah State Tax Commission. A consideration of the
hundreds of pages making up these two exhibits discloses
the public recognition that lands in the disputed area are located
in San Juan County, and those concerned with the protection
of the title to their properties located in the disputed area
place them of record in San Juan County.
1912 SURVEY
Defendant Grand County inaccurately and without any
foundation whatsoever, contends that in 1912 the county
boundary had been surveyed by mutual agreement and joint
effort, placing the line coincident with the south line of Township 26 South. Defendant Grand County took the deposition
of an 86-year-old former resident of San Juan County, who
states that he was with a surveyor and line-man who were
surveying the county line in 1912 (Tr. 459). The line surveyed
did not follow the township line (Tr. 479).
The witness stated that he had observed section corners
from a 1906 survey and that the line being surveyed as the
boundary line was north of the section corners (Tr. 480).

6
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The witness stated that there were people from both Grand
County and San Juan County who helped on the survey, but
described those people at Page 482 of the transcript as people
who volunteered to help "who were running cattle or sheep
in that particular area. And as you would come near their
location they would help."
Though the defendant in its Statement of Facts asserts
that the two counties by mutual agreement conducted a survey
in 1912, there is no evidence whatsoever that Grand County
ever participated in the survey; never paid anything; no minutes
of Grand County were introduced showing that it was aware
of the survey; no evidence was introduced that the county surveyors or either county participated, or that the counties had
county surveyors. The only evidence introduced by Grand
County was that there was unilateral action by San Juan County
in surveying the line.
Defendant's Exhibit 132 is an excerpt from the minutes of
San Juan of March 7, 1910, showing that the San Juan County
Commission directed its surveyor to survey several roads "and
to survey lines between Grand and San Juan Counties." No
such direction was ever shown by Grand County Commissioners,
no agreement is shown by any evidence, nor is there shown any
expenditure authorized by Grand County in connection with
this survey.
Defendant claims that all of the "old maps" show Parallel
38 o 30' North Latitude as coincident with the south line of
Township 26 South. Exhibit 96-P of greater antiquity shows
the parallel north of the township line.

7
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SURVEY AND MONUMENTING BY STATE ENGINEER
Neither the Utah State Engineer nor San Juan County
has abandoned the proceeding to survey and monument the
county boundary between San Juan and Grand Counties. Grand
County, in writing and publicly, announced it would no longer
participate in the monumenting and surveying of the boundary
line. This, of course, interrupted the completion of the survey.
The action before the Court was necessitated because the
announced refusal of Grand County to honor the line so monumented required that Grand County's assertion of jurisdiction
beyond the statutory boundary line be quieted and determined.
The line will be monumented as soon as the contentions
of Grand County are determined.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT GRAND COUNTY'S COUNTERCLAIM WHICH
SOUGHT TO HAVE THE COURT FIX THE BOUNDARY
AT A POINT DIFFERENT FROM THE STATUTORY
DESCRIPTION.
(A) GRAND COUNTY, BY ENGAGING THE STATE
ENGINEER OF UTAH, PURSUANT TO TITLE 17-1-33
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, TO SURVEY AND
MONUMENT PARALLEL 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE
AS A COMMON BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN
GRAND AND SAN JUAN COUNTIES, WAIVED
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ANY RIGHT OR CLAIM TO A BOUNDARY LINE
AT ANY OTHER LOCATION. BY ITS PETITION
AND RELATED ACTS GRAND COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING, AND/OR WAIVED ANY
RIGHT, TO CLAIM A DIFFERENT BOUNDARY.
The District Court properly determined that Title 17-1-33
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the statutory and exclusive
procedure for surveying and monumenting county boundaries
where there is uncertainty or dispute as to their location. Grand
County initiated and joined in engaging the State Engineer
to take jurisdiction in surveying and monumenting the boundary, as the following facts conclusively establish:
Exhibit 49-P is a letter from Grand County to the State
Engineer dated March 12, 1958, a copy of which was mailed to
the county attorney of San Juan County:
"A dispute has arisen as to the location of the boundary line between Grand County and San Juan County.
"The statute which defines the boundary line of the
Counties described the line as being Parallel 38 o 30'
North Latitude. Some of the older maps show the
boundary line to coincide with the south line of Township 26 South; however, later maps indicate that the
boundary should be approximately one-half mile north
of the township line afore described.
"Under the provisions of Section 17-1-33, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, the Grand County Commissioners
request the services of the State Engineer to determine
such boundary line.''
Exhibit 48 is a letter to the State Engineer by which San
Juan County has submitted a similar request, and which was
forwarded to the State Engineer March 10, 1958.

9
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Exhibit 50 is a letter of Wayne P. Criddle, State Engineer,
dated March 19, 1958, directed to the County Attorneys of
both counties, acknowledging receipt of the request for the
establishment of the boundary line, and suggesting a meeting
at Moab.

At Pages 310-311 of the record, Mr. William C. Walton,
County Commissioner of San Juan County, states the meeting
was then held at Moab with the State Engineer and representatives of the respective counties, all of whom are named, and
that the following occurred (Tr. 313):
"Yes, I suggested that it (the common county boundary) be referred to the State Engineer and we would
accept whatever designation the State Engineer put on
it and asked Mr. Bolden of Grand County if he would
do the same, and he said yes."
At Page 314 of the record Mr. Walton st ated:

"Q. Now, can you tell us whether the statement you
have given us, leaving it to the State Engineer,
was made before or after the reconnaissance?
A. It was made before the reconnaissance."
Then followed correspondence hereinafter set forth:
Exhibit 53 is a letter of April 11, 1958, to the County
Attorneys of each county from the State Engineer, advising
that pursuant to his best information the boundary line is
"3500 feet north of the south line of Township 26 South."
Exhibit 54 is a letter from the State Engineer to the County
Attorneys, dated April 15, 1958, indicating that the boundary
line could be best established by simply "measuring the hori-

10
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zontal distance from the section corners north to where the
parallel should be ... Incidentally, if we had to call up the
Coast and Geodetic Survey on this problem, it is possible that
the cost might exceed $50,000."
Exhibit 55 is a letter from the San Juan County Attorney
to the State Engineer, expressing that his county would be
willing to have the point fixed at 3500 feet north of the south
line of Township 26 South, and requesting one of the State
Engineers to monument such a boundary.
Exhibit 56 is a letter from the County Attorney of Grand
County to the State Engineer to the effect that his county was
not in a position at that time to accept as a fact the assumpion
that Parallel 38 30' is on a line 3500 feet north of the south
line of Township 26 South.
o

Exhibit 57 is a letter dated April 23, 1958, from San Juan
County to the State Engineer, requesting that the State Engineer
proceed to employ the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey to survey
the line.
Exhibit 58 is a letter of Wayne D. Criddle, State Engineer
of Utah, dated April 25, 1958, to the Director of the U. S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey, requesting their assistance in
running the boundary line, copies of which were sent to each
county.
Exhibit 59 is a letter from the U. S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey to the State Engineer, indicating that a reconnaissance
survey could be provided for an estimated cost of $1200.00.
Exhibit 60 is a letter dated May 2, 1958, from the State
Engineer to the County Attorney of Grand County, enclosing

11
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copies of Exhibit 59 and requesting that funds of $600.00 be
forwarded for the survey.
Exhibit 61 is a letter dated May 2, 1958, with copies to
both County Attorneys from the State Engineer of Utah, which
reads as follows:
"Gentlemen:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter just received f£om the
Coast and Geodetic Survey which I believe is selfexplanatory.
"Because of the economic importance to your counties of the positioning of latitude 38 o 30' with respect
to the township line, we feel that only the most authentic survey possible should be considered. This assumes
that both counties will not agree to the positioning as
shown on the new quadrangle sheets of the U.S. Geological Survey.
"We recognize that, at this time, you may not wish
to bear the cost of marking the entire boundary with
monuments two miles apart, however, such complete
marking might be done at one time most economically
while the surveyors are on the ground. Perhaps monuments established at the Colorado line and at the west
end of the joint county line, plus several monuments
in Ranges 20 and 21 East, may serve your immediate
purposes. However, to fix the costs will apparently
require a visit of U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey personnel to the area.
"We are sure that you desire this problem cleaned
up as soon as possible. Do you wish us to officially
request the Coast and Geodetic Survey to make the
reconnaissance and will each county agree to underwrite the $600 cost of this preliminary investigation?
Sincerely yours,
Wayne D. Criddle"

12
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Exhibit 62 is a letter dated May 5, 1958, to the State Engineer of Utah from San Juan County, agreeing that it will
"underwrite one-half of the cost of such investigation, or any
other expenses involved in having this matter settled." Exhibit
63 is a letter of May 6, 1958, from Grand County to the State
Engineer of Utah, which reads as follows:
"Dear Mr. Criddle:
Re: Boundary dispute between Grand
and San Juan Counties.
"Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1958,
regarding the above entitled matter.
"Grand County agrees to and will underwrite the
approximate cost of $600.00 for its share of the preliminary investigation to establish the boundary line.
"The County is not in any position to create any extensive obligation regarding the matter and it is hoped
that the line can be established somewhere in relation
to the South boundary line of Township 26S as there
appears to be no question as to where the South line of
Township 26S is located.
"It is our thinking that once the actual location of
latitude 38 o 30' is established on the earth's surface
at some point in the Colorado River area there will
be no need to set markers along the boundary line,
except in three or four predetermined places."

Exhibit 69 is a letter dated June 4, 1958, to the State Engineer of Utah from Grand County, enclosing $600.00 "as Grand
County's share of the estimated cost of a reconnaissance of
the boundaries between Grand and San Juan Counties."
Exhibit 72 is a check of Grand County showing the payment of an additional $741.86 on March 2, 1959, for "recon-
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na1ssance (only) for survey to locate the boundary between
Grand and San Juan Counties."
At Pages 200 and 201 of the record the Deputy State
Engineer testified "that the purpose of this survey, as far as
we were concerned, was to determine engineering-wise the position of 38 o 30' as close as he could determine within the funds
available and within time limitations. And we further indicated
that in order that his survey-there should be something that
would be something we could tie to later on-that he should
mark 38 ° 30' as near as he could determine it from his survey
positions along the 38 o 30' parallel on the ground."
Stations were then set up at intervals along 38 o 30' by the
survey crew, which Mr. Lambert, the Deputy State Engineer,
identified (Tr. 201) as "a stake supported by guy wire and in
some instances it was still :flagged and in some instances the
:flag blown off and this stake was anchored into the surface of
the ground at a semi-permanent position."
Exhibits 76 and 77 are plats prepared by the U. S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey, indicating the work they have done, and
illustrating thereon by a designated line on the plats the position
38 o 30' North Latitude, with the various stations marking on
the ground the position of that latitude from Green River to
the Colorado boundary, and indicating the relation of such
boundary line to established monuments, such as the South
Quarter Corner of Sec. 32, T. 26 S., R. 20 East (Exhibit 79),
and designated "Coast and Geodetic Survey Stations."
The foregoing facts conclusively establish that Grand
County engaged the State Engineer of Utah to "permanently
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determine such boundary line." Such facts conclusively e~tab
lish that in connection with such proceeding Grand County
agreed to accept the determination made by the State Engineer
and that it was not until the "reconnaissance survey" revealed
that the boundary was approximately two-thirds of a mile
north of the South boundary of most of the Townships 26
South that Grand County refused to accept the determination
made by the State Engineer. The claim that there had been a
"survey in 1912" was made for the first time near the conclusion of the trial.
As a matter of law, Grand County is bound by the State
Engineer's determination of the boundary, and has waived its
rights, if any, and is estopped to claim otherwise for two
reasons:
FIRST: Estoppel from taking an inconsistent position.
Section 17-1-33 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the exclusive method provided by the Legislature for surveying and
monumenting an uncertain or disputed boundary on the ground.
A county requesting the State Engineer to act under this statute
admits:

( 1) That there is a dispute or uncertainty as to a
boundary.

( 2) That the county surveyors have failed to agree
or have failed to establish a boundary.
( 3) That the State Engineer can survey and monument only the boundary established by law. The law
which establishes county boundaries for these two
counties is the Utah Statute 17-1-22 U.C.A. 1953, for
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San Juan County, and 17-1-13 U.C.A. 1953 for Grand
County.
( 4) That the line so monumented shall be the line
until modified by the Legislature.
Courts will not permit the initiating of statutory remedies
and permit the initiating party to take a contrary position.
Having admitted the lawful statutory boundary by the
petition to the State Engineer, Grand County is estopped from
asserting a boundary at another location.
Having admitted that the county surveyors had failed to
agree or otherwise failed to establish the boundary, in order to
get the State Engineer to act, Grand County will not be permitted to assert that the county surveyors had fixed the boundary
or that the counties had agreed on the boundary.
In Hinsdale County vs. Mineral County, 48 Pac. 675, the
issued involved was the location of a common boundary line
between two counties. The Colorado statute provided in a
manner quite similar to Utah's that when a dispute arose, and
upon application of the counties involved, "it shall be the duty
of such State Engineer . . . to run out and establish such line
. . . and to fix and define such boundary line by plain and
substantial mounds and markers." The determination of the
Colorado State Engineer is made final unless an appeal is taken
to the District Court.
The parent counties concerned had petitioned the State
Engineer to survey an uncertain and indefinite boundary line,
and, pursuant to notice, the State Engineer had made the survey
and made a report to each of the counties of his work, accom-
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panied by plats on which the boundaries were shown. One
of the counties contended that it was not bound by the determination of the County State Engineer because for sometime
before the attempted boundary adjustment its parent county
had exercised dominion over the territory in dispute and had
claimed and successfully asserted the right to collect taxes
in that territory. The Court then states at Page 680:
"When it (Saguache County) petitioned the State
Engineer for the adjustment of its disputed boundary,
it confessed that it was uncertain where the boundary
was, and whether the territory in dispute belonged
to it or not. It placed itself on an exact level with the
opposing claimant of the territory; that its claim of
boundary was not acquiesced in by Hinsdale County
is evidenced by the fact that the latter county also
petitioned for an adjustment of the same boundary.
There were opposing claims to the territory, and if
it could possibly be said that the acts of dominion exercised by Saguache County over this territory invested
that county with any right, legal or equitable, it waived
those rights by invoking the action of which counsel
complain."
The Supreme Court of the United States has announced
a similar doctrine of law that a party will not be permitted to
occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position with regard
to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with,
one previously assumed by him.
In Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. Ed. 168, an action
was brought against the stockholders of a bank to pay the
liabilities of the bank as provided by statute. The stockholders
raised as one of the defenses that the corporation of which

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

they were shareholders had no legal existence.
rejected this defense by saying:

The court

''Parties must take the consequences of the position
they· assume. They are estopped to deny the reality of
the state of things which they have made appear to exist,
and upon which others have been led to rely. Sound
ethics require that the apparent, in its effects and consequences, should be as if it were real, and the law
properly so regards it." (Citing authorities).
The same doctrine of law has been applied by state courts.
In State ex rei Fitch vs. St ate Board of School Commissioners
of Wyoming, 27 Wyo. 54, 191 Pac. 1073, it was contended
that the bid was not proper at the public sale and therefore
the alleged sale was not valid. The court, in holding that the
sale was valid, stated:
"It further appears by the respondent's own evidence
that not only in this instance, but also in such sales
throughout the state generally, the state officers have
regarded and acted upon the guaranty of the applicant
as a bid. Having placed that construction upon the
language contained in the guaranty, they should not
be heard to here insist upon a different construction
of it."

SECOND: Grand County having represented to the State
Engineer and San .fuan County that the boundary to be surveyed
is Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude, and in reliance thereon
the State Engineer and San Juan County having entered into
an agreement pursuant to which that line was surveyed and
marked and moneys expended in reliance thereon, Grand County
is estopped to assert that the line to be surveyed is other than
38° 30' North Latitude.
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Grand County induced San Juan County to enter into an
agreement and expend $1341.66 on surveying Parallel 38 ° 30'
North Latitude as the boundary. Grand County will not now
be allowed to contend the line to be surveyed or the boundary
to be located is a point other than 38 ° 30' North Latitude.
Grand County petitioned the State Engineer of Utah to
survey and monument Parallel 38 30' North Latitude as the
boundary pursuant to Section 17-1-33 U.C.A., 1953 (Ex. 49).
Grand County duly notified San Juan County of submission of
the matter to the State Engineer.
o

A meeting was held at Moab, with Commissioners of
both counties attending with the Utah State Engineer, and
both counties agreed to abide by Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude
as established by the State Engineer (Tr. 313).
Proposals of the State Engineer to accept the boundary
as 3500 feet north of south section corners of Township 26
South (Ex. 53), or by measuring 3500 feet north of such
section corners (Ex. 53), were rejected by Grand County, as
a result of which was the agreement (Ex. 63) by which each
county agreed to have the State Engineer secure the services
of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey to survey and
stake Parallel 38 30' North Latitude as the boundary.
o

Each county was sent a copy of the plat evidencing the
enlarged reconnaissance survey, and showing the locations of
the boundary markers, and the position of 38 o 30' North Latitude in relation to the various U. S. Coast and Geodetic triangulation stations, and also in relation to the location of
several section corners of the south line of Townships 26 South.
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Such plat confirmed what the State Engineer had previously
told the two counties that the county boundary is approximately
3500 feet north of the south lines of Townships 26 South.
The two counties agreed on the fact that the boundary
to be surveyed and marked was 38 o 30' North Latitude. This
fact having been established by the agreement, neither party
may thereafter repudiate that fact and contend for a different
boundary from the true line after San Juan County proceeded
in good faith in reliance on the submission by Grand County
to the State Engineer and expended moneys toward the ascertainment of the true boundary line.
At 31 C.J.S., Par. 55, at Page 232, the rule is announced:
"In the absence of fraud, acident or mistake, parties
to a contract and their privies are estopped to deny
facts agreed on or assumed in the making of the contract."
This Court in Migliaccio vs. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 232
Pac. (2) 195, was considering a case in which the appellant
having an interest in a mining property stood silent while
representations derogatory to his interests were made, and
in reliance on which moneys and effort were expended by
respondent, all of which were known to appellant. In applying
an equitable estoppel against the appellant asserting his full
interest in the property against respondent, the Court states
at Page 199:
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle
by which a party knows or should know the truth is
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from
denying or asserting the contrary of any material fact
which by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative,
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intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has
induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the
facts and who had a right to rely upon such words
and conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby,
as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing
his position in such a way that he would suffer injury
if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed."
The position of Grand County in initiating and agreeing
to this survey and securing the agreement of San Juan County
was that the boundary to be surveyed was Parallel 38 o 30'
North Latitude. Certainly Grand County will not now be
permitted to claim the boundary is at a different parallel.
Grand County, having petitioned the State Engineer concerning an uncertain boundary, will not be allowed to assert
that the boundary line was previously fixed and established
in a location different from the line defined by the statute.
Other agreements and practices which estop Grand County
from asserting a contrary position to Parallel 38 ° 30' North
Latitude as the boundary, are the following:
For twenty years Grand County had approved the distribution of "B" and "C" road funds on the basis of the boundary
with San Juan County being at Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude.
Maps of Grand County showing roads qualifying, mileage
computation and county boundaries were prepared by the State
Road Commission annually and formally approved by Grand
County Commissioners. Such maps showed the boundary with
San Juan at Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude and as a point
two-thirds of a mile north of the south township line of Township 26 South. (See Ex. 46-47 and 104). This has been true
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since 1940 (Tr. 281-296), with such maps the basis for the
distribution of the funds.
From 1952 through 1960, Grand County by written agreements. has charged San Juan County for maintaining all roads
in the disputed area on the basis of the county boundary being
two-thirds of a mile north of the township line. These charges
have exceeded $2500.00 a year for the years since 1956. (Ex.
112-116-117).
(B) THE PURPORTED SURVEY OF 1912 DID NOT
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 17-1-33
U.C.A. 1953, TO ESTABLISH A DISPUTED COUNTY
BOUNDARY.
Under its Point No. 1 Grand County claims it is entitled
to a judgment establishing the line "surveyed, marked and
monumented by the mutual consent and agreement of the two
parties to be the true common boundary line between the two
counties." The burden of defendant's argument under this
point is that the 1912 survey testified to by C. R. Christensen
constitutes a survey meeting the requirements of Section 17-1-33
U.C.A., 1953.
This statute does provide the exclusive method by which
uncertain and disputed boundaries are to be established on
the ground. Its requirements are:
(a) The line "may be determined by the county surveyors
of t,he counties interested, or if they fail to agree";
(b) By the State Engineer on application of either or both
county commissions "by making the necessary survey
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and erecting suitable monuments to designate the
boundary.''
(c) Neither the State Engineer nor County Surveyor shall
have any authority other than "to erect suitable monuments to designate boundaries as they are now established by law."
Defendant Grand County, at Page 10 of its brief, states
that its evidence on this point rests entirely on the description
of a survey m 1912 observed by C. R. Christensen, plus San
Juan County minutes (Exhibits 129-139). Its case fails for the
following reasons:
1. There is no evidence that either San Juan County or

Grand County had a surveyor in 1912.

A review of Exhibits 129 to 139 indicates that in 1910
San Juan County had employed a surveyor Woodman to do
work on roads and boundary lines in 1910. None of Exhibits
129 to 139 concern the purported work done in 1912, and do
not identify any person as a County Surveyor.
None of the testimony admitted in evidence identifies
any person as a County Surveyor of either San Juan County
or Grand County.
2. If there was a County Surveyor, there is no evidence that

the San Juan County Surveyor or Grand County Surveyor
participated.

Neither the Exhibits 129 to 139, nor the testimony of
Christensen admitted in evidence, identify any person as the
County Surveyor of either Grand County or San Juan County.
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Mr. Christiansen was not the county surveyor nor even a surveyor. He might have been county assessor or sheriff. The
statute, however, never did authorize any county officers other
than the county surveyors of the two counties to determine
the county boundary. Consequently, there was an utter lack of
compliance with the statute.
3. There is no showing that Grand County authorized or

participated in the 1912 survey in any manner whatsoever.

No minutes or testimony were introduced to show that
Grand County or San Juan County, or any officials of either
San Juan County or Grand County, were authorized to act or
were acting for their counties. Neither is there any evidence
of any agreement or that either County authorized anyone to
participate in the 1912 survey.
4. The line surveyed was testified by Christensen to have
been run on a course north of any section line.
At T r. 480 Christensen is asked:

"Q. But this particular line that you were attempting
to survey, was it north of the section corner?
A. Well, that is what the boys said. As I said, there
was different survey marks there and the marks
on them indicated that they had been done in
1906. I remember that quite well, but I don't
know who did it.
Q. And the line you were running was north of that
line?
A. Yes, sir."
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5. The Finding of the District Court that the 1912 Line was
not established and cannot be found is supported by the
evidence.
Christensen (Tr. 479) stated, "the line did not follow the
township line."
Richard 0. Cozzens, a surveyor employed by defendant,
testified that either during or immediately prior to the trial
he had followed a mound of stones which indicated a boundary
line. Each and every monument Cozzens testified to was identified with a United States Land Survey. Each mound of stone
Cozzens identified was a section corner or a quarter corner
of a United States Land Survey on the south line of two townships (Tr. 430, 433-434). The mounds of stone he found are
described in the field notes of an official Land Office survey in
1902, being a survey of portions of Township 26 South, Range
23 East (Ex. 125). The other mounds are described in the
field notes of a partial survey of 1894 of the south line of
Township 26 South, Range 23 East (Ex. 120). There is no
testimony that any of these monuments were those erected in
1912.
Defendant called an old-time resident Holyoak as a witness
to certain monuments, and he identified the monuments as
those he had seen in 1907. Exhibits 120-D and 125-D are
field notes of Land Office surveys which show that rock monuments were erected on the south line of the two townships in
question in 1894 and 1902. As Mr. Holyoak saw the monuments five years before 1912, they could only be monuments
established by government surveyors some ten to eighteen years
prior to the 1912 monuments.
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Neither testimony nor minutes indicated that a plat or
field notes were prepared in connection with any survey in
1912. There is, therefore, no evidence in this record, nor any
evidence indicated, which could possibly identify any point
established or monumented in 1912. It would be futile to
attempt to locate any course run in 1912.
The finding of the District Court with reference to the
1912 survey that 'fhe extact location thereof cannot be determined" is certainly true, and no contrary determination could
be made on any evidence introduced in this case.
(C) THE DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO ESTABLISH A COUNTY
BOUNDARY IN UTAH AT OTHER THAN THE
LOCATION PROVIDED BY STATUTE.
1. PARALLEL 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE IS A

DEFINITE AND ASCERTAINABLE STATUTORY COUNTY BOUNDARY LINE AND CAN
NOT BE LEGALLY CHANGED BY ACQUIESCENCE.
20 C.J.S., Sec. 22, Pages 773-774 states:

"Acquiescence can be considered only when there
is uncertainty because of a conflict in the calls, monuments or descriptions employed in the statute fixing
the line; ... A county's boundary line, however, as
fixed by statute, if determinable, cannot be changed
by laches or acquiescence, and acquiescence in another
line is immaterial where the true boundary line can
be determined as a question of law."
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El Elmore County vs. Tallaloosa County, 131 So. 552, the
Court states:

"If a boundary line of a county can be ascertained
as a question of law, acquiescence in another line by
contiguous counties is immaterial."
In view of the provisions of Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah, this Court in Summit County vs. Rich County,
57 Utah 553, 195 Pac. 639, held that not even the state legislature can alter a county boundary line which is definite,
stating:
"The fact that other parts of the boundary line between the two counties may be ambiguous or unascertainable by engineering skill, did not justify the
legislature in ignoring altogether that which was clear
and unmistakable."
In a subsequent determination between Summit and Rich
Counties ( 63 Utah, 193, 224 Pac. 653) this Court again states
that the legislature cannot create a new line "unless the description of the boundary line is so indefinite, uncertain or ambiguous that the line cannot be definitely determined from the description of it."
Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude is, and at all times since
it was first created as a county boundary line by the territorial
legislature, has been a definite and ascertainable line.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Yuma County vs. Maricopa
County, 19 Ariz. 475, 172 Pac. 276, states:
"The boundary line being the meridian line its
description was not indefinite . . . The fact that a
certain meridian of longitude was designated as the
boundary did not render the descriptive line uncertain
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or make the statute ambiguous so as to require. construction through the aid of extrinsic circumstances.
Although a line so described may be difficult of practical location, nevertheless when employed to define
a boundary line it constitutes the true line to be followed in making a practical location."
2. GRAND COUNTY OFFICERS BY THEIR ACTIONS

COULD NOT EXTEND THE TERRITORY OF
THAT COUNTY; NEITHER COULD SAN JUAN
COUNTY OFFICERS BY INACTION CONTRACT
THE TERRITORY OF SAN JUAN COUNTY.
As expressed by the Colorado Court in Board of Commissioners of Ouray County vs. Board of Commissioners of San
Juan County} 143 Pac. 841, at Page 842:
''A county line is not determined by the actions of
omission or commission of public officers."
In Hinsdale County vs. Mineral County} 48 Pac. 675, the
Court states:
"Saguache County is not a county by prescription.
It was created by statute. Outside of statute it has no

existence and all of its territorial rights are derived from
statute. It has and can have no territory except what
the statute gives it."
3. ASSUMING ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF ARGUMENT THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ACQUISCENCE MAY APPLY AS TO A COUNTY
BOUNDARY, NEVERTHELESS GRAND COUNTY FAILED IN ITS PROOF TO ESTABLISH A
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
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In Nelson v. DeRouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273, at
Page 277, this Honorable Court not only held that a party
who asserts acquiescence in a line differing from the true line
has the burden of proof, but that the proof must show that
the line varying from the true line,

( 1) Has been open to observation and marked by monuments, fences, or buildings;
( 2) Knowingly acquiesced in as the recognized true line
for a long period of time; and
( 3) The parties must have occupied up to that line.
The counties, of course, do not "occupy" the lands within
their boundaries. In the Nelson case the court refused to
apply the doctrine of acquiescence for there was no proof that
the. fences were located by agreement of the parties, and the
only time the boundary location was discussed "it was agreed
to have a survey made and abide by the true boundary so
established.''
The line contended for by Grand County as having been
established by "acquiescence" as the county boundary consists
of the south lines of "Township 26 South ... as said township
line is now marked and as it extends between the eastern
boundary of the State of Utah and the middle of the main
channel of the Green River ... " Neither county had anything
to do with the surveys of the south lines of said townships,
10 in number. There is an offset of 623 feet to the north from
the southeast corner of Township 26 South, Range 24 East,
to the southwest corner of Township 26 South, Range 25 East.
The south lines of those townships were all surveyed by the
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United States as part of the public lands. The south lines of
Townships 26 South, Ranges 17¥2, 18 and 19 East were not
surveyed until 1954. Thos~ township lines did not exist until
1954 and "acquiescence" could not apply to a non-existent line.
The line at Range 24 East was not surveyed until 1946.
The only evidence of monuments on the south lines of
those townships consists of (a) United States survey monuments erected as section corners, quarter corners and witness
corners; (b) three segments of fence on or near the township
line in the area of the airport, Section 36, T. 26 S., R. 22 E.;
and (c) two highway signs to the south of the township lines.
Each of the section corners, quarter corners and witness
corners was erected by the United States, the first ones in
October, 1880, and the last monuments in 1954. Not one of
those monuments was ever erected to mark any county boundary. There is no evidence that either county erected the road
signs, nor that either county constructed any one of the three
sections of fence. Consequently, neither county had anything
to do with establishment or maintenance of any of those
"monuments." Not a single one of those "monuments" was
located in its position to establish a county line nor to settle
a boundary dispute. At Ranges 17¥2, 18 and 19 East, the
monuments did not exist prior to 1954, and therefore existed
only for a very short period of time prior to suit.
In the Nelson case this Court said that "the fact of locating
a building or a fence or other structure that may later take on
the nature of a monument, in the absence of, or without the
knowledge of, the adjoining owners, or upon a supposition
that said location is the true boundary line when in fact it is
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not, and when no agreement or long acquiescence is shown,
does not establish a boundary line different from the true one."
Furthermore, in Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U.S. 21, 71 L. E.
145, ____ S. Ct. ____ , it was declared that in order for a line to
be acquiesced in and adopted as the boundary it would have
to be established on the ground and marked. The Court further
remarked that the conduct of both states in requiring settlement of the boundary negatived acquiescence.
The following matters of record conclusively show that
there was no acquiescence in the south lines of Township 26
South by either Grand County or San Juan County:
By letter dated September 5, 1925, Exhibit 78, the State
Engineer recommended that the Legislature change the boundary line to the south lines of Township 26 South as far as
then surveyed and platted. However, by resolution dated
October 5, 1925, Exhibit 164, Grand County Commissioners
declared that "Grand County does not feel that it should
agree on the township line as representing the county boundary
if, in fact, it does not do so"; and that the portion of the line
in the vicinity of the Colorado River should "be accurately
established." Said resolution negatives "acquiescence".
For the past twenty years Grand County and San Juan
County have affirmatively recognized and approved county
maps prepared by the State Road Commission for purposes
of allocation of Class "B" and "C" road funds, which maps
dearly show the position of Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude
is about two-thirds of a mile north of all of the south lines
of Township 26 South except at Ranges 25 and 26 East, where
the lines are offset to the north. See Exhibits 45, 46 and 47.
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These maps showing the position of the parallel were made
from surveys, and from the known latitude and longitude of
various Coast and Geodetic triangulation · stations in Grand
and San Juan Counties (Tr. 281-296). These triangulation
stations were established between 1893 and 1938. See Exhibit
78. One second of latitude is 101.167 feet (Tr. 506). It is
a matter of computation from the known latitude of the various
Coast and Geodetic stations to determine the position of 38 ° 30'.
Exhibit 104 is a resolution of Grand County Commissioners
dated May 4, 1959, approving the road map prepared by the
State Road Commission for allocation of Class "B" and "C"
road funds. See also resolution dated September 12, 1960,
Exhibit 115. Exhibit 110 shows the allocations of said Class
"B" and "C" road funds since 1940, based upon the mileage
established by said maps. These maps clearly show that the
entire "disputed area" between 38° 30' North Latitude on the
north and the south lines of Township 26 South on the south
to be entirely in San Juan County.
From 1952 to 1960 Grand County maintained certain
portions of the roads in San Juan County and charged San
Juan County for those maintenance costs. The county maps
used for allocating the Class "B" and "C" road funds were
used to compute the mileage of roads maintained by Grand
County for San Juan County. The roads in the "disputed area"
were included in the road mileage maintained by Grand County
which were charged to San Juan County. Exhibit 114 is a copy
of the agreement between the two counties dated 1955 for
maintenance of certain San Juan County roads by Grand County.
Exhibit 20 consists of photo copies of statements submitted
by Grand County to San Juan County for such road maintenance
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and warrants issued by San Juan County in payment of those
charges, from 1952 to 1959 amounting to thousands of dollars.
See also Exhibits 112, 116 and 117. After having charged San
Juan County for many years for maintaining the roads in the
"disputed area", the claim of "acquiescence" in the south line
of Township 26 South as the "boundary" not only fails, but
Grand County is estopped to deny that 38 ° 30' North Latitude
is the actual boundary line.
On March 12, 1958, Grand County requested the State
Engineer to establish the boundary line and unequivocally
declared that the boundary line is 38 o 30' North Latitude.
(Exhibit 49.) Grand County was well aware of the maps
showing the position of the county boundary to the north of
the south lines of the townships, for Grand County mentioned
those maps in its letter to the State Engineer. Furthermore,
for twenty years Grand County had transacted business on
the basis of those maps showing Parallel 38 ° 30' North
Latitude to be approximately two-thirds of a mile north of
all except two of the south lines of Township 26 South. Grand
County made no pretense of "acquiescence" in the south lines
of the townships in March, 1958. When the County Commissioners met with the State Engineer, Grand County made no
contention that the south lines of Township 26 South had been
established as the boundary, but agreed to accept the determination by the State Engineer. In the letter dated April,
1958, Exhibit 56, no claim of acquiescence was even hinted.
The question was, Where is 38 o 30' North Latitude located?
On May 6, 1958, Grand County stated by letter to the
State Engineer that "it hoped that the line can be established
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somewhere in relation to the south boundary line of Township
26 South," and "once the actual location of latitude 38° 30'
is established on the earth's surface . . . there will be no need
to set markers along the boundary line, except in three or four
predetermined places." Grand County made no claim then that
there was any variance from true 38 o 30', nor that the boundary
had been established on the south lines of the township by
..acquiescence."
This action was filed December 28, 1958. The original
answer and counterclaim of Grand County was filed February
5, 1959, setting up the claim of acquiescence in the south lines
of the townships as the boundary line. San Juan County submitted interrogatories. On September 18, 1959, Grand County,
by H. B. Evans, County Commissioner, signing under oath, and
Harry E. Snow, Esq., County Attorney, signing as counsel,
answered inter alia:

"Q. State in detail all of the facts which defendant will
offer in evidence at the trial and all facts upon
which defendant bases its allegation 'that the
plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed as to its
(boundary) location and for 68 years last past
both the plaintiff and defendant have agreed and
recognized that the true boundary between said
counties coincides with the south boundary of
Township 26 South ... ' "
Answer by Grand County: "As of this date, it is impossible for the defendant to state and set forth
in detail all of the facts the defendant will offer
in evidence at the trial, if any." (Italics added).
In Paragraph 9 of its counterclaim, defendant Grand
County stated that for 68 years the boundary had been con-
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sidered by plaintiff and defendant counties as coincident with
the south boundary line of Township 26 South, and in its
interrogatories plaintiff asked the defendant to state in detail
what evidence and facts it would produce at the trial to support
such allegation. Grand County answered:
"It is impossible for the defendant to state and set
forth in detail what evidence and facts defendant will
produce at the trial of this case in support of che
allegation of said Paragraph 9."
By Interrogatory 8 plaintiff asked: "Specifically, what facts
defendant will rely on at the trial, if any, to show how and when
said disputed area became a part of Grand County?" Grand
County answered:
"As of this date it is impossible for the defendant
to state and set forth upon what facts defendant will
rely at the trial, if any, to show how and when the
said disputed area became a part of Grand County."
(Italics added).
Interrogatories 9 and 10 requested Grand County to state
what facts it would introduce to show that the statute defining
the San Juan County boundary never became operative' and
by what statutes the territory was placed in Grand County.
Both questions were answered by Grand County that "it is
impossible for defendant to set forth such statutes" (R. 27-31).

It is inconceivable that a party claiming long acquiescence
could not name any facts or evidence to support that claim.
The foregoing certainly discloses a hidden mental theory on
the part of an undisclosed person and not the open, public
recognition required to establish acquiescence.
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Most of the argument in the Brief of Appellant is devoted
to the contention that by agreement of the two counties the
line was surveyed and monumented, and that such line was
coincident with the south lines of Township 26 South. The
only witness presented was C. R. Christensen, who testified
to a 1912 survey. At the opening of trial it was admitted by
Grand County that it had no plat of any survey (Tr. 16). No
mention of any 1912 survey was made until February 8, 1961
(Tr. 445). There are no field notes and no plat of such
"survey" to show where the line was supposedly run with
respect to any objects or monuments, and it would be utterly
impossible to retrace the line. Counsel for Grand County
admitted defendant had no evidence to tie with the 1912 line
to any parallel of latitude (Tr. 447). Mr. Christensen's testimony states that the line run in 1912 did not follow any township line, and that the line was to the north of the section
corners. His testimony also refuted the argument that the south
lines of township were established as the boundary line.
Grand County tried to overcome the evidence which clearly
showed that for over twenty years it had recognized Parallel
38 o 30' North Latitude as the boundary line, by a number of
incompetent or irrelevant documents. It showed that a few
people who received patents to land in the "disputed area"
recorded the patents in Grand County instead of San Juan
County, and that by reason of such errors Grand County
assessed those few tracts for taxes and collected taxes. The tax
collections constituted only a small fraction of the total taxes
collected on properties in the disputed area, the great bulk of
which were collected by San Juan County because they were
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levied on public utilities and the State Tax Commission used
38 o 30' North Latitude as the county line as required by statute.
Counsel for Grand County argued that the State Land
-Board "recognized" the south line of Township 26 South as
the boundary by issuing patents to lands in the disputed area,
stating that the lands were in Grand County. Exhibits 167 and
168 consist of over 700 pages of documents recorded in San
Juan County covering lands in the "disputed area", including
mining locations, oil and gas leases, and other instruments.
Included in Exhibit 168 is a State potash lease dated December
21, 1956, ML-15092, which states that the lands are in San
Juan County. There are oil and gas leases covering lands in
Grand County which are recorded in San Juan County. The
State Land Board and others made a number of mistakes in
stating the county in which certain lands were located. Those
errors could not change the boundary line. If they could, then
it could be argued that the county boundary line is over a mile
north of 38 ° 30' North Latitude by reason of such errors in
recordation.
Grand County contends that a township plat from the
United States public land surveys, showing the southeast corner
is 38 ° 30' North Latitude, establishes the location of the
parallel. If that be so, then Exhibit 4 shows that the southeast
corner of Township~ South, Range 24 East is 38° 29' North
Latitude (or 1.15 miles farther south, one minute of latitude
being 6105.6 feet. R. 506). Legally, defendant's contention is
not valid, but further, it is in error factually.
Exhibits 9 and 10, excerpts from the Manual of Survey
Instructions, Bureau of Land Management, show that to and
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including the year 1930 the land surveyors were not required to
compute latitude closer than one minute (which amounts to
6105.6 feet or 1.15 miles). Later, the surveyors were required
to tie their land surveys to the Coast and Geodetic triangulation
stations and to use latitude and longitude as computed by the
Coast and Geodetic Survey. Grand County did not show that
any one in either county prior to 1958 ever looked at any of
the old Land Office plats.
Grand County introduced several "old maps" of Utah on
which the county line was shown to be in the area of the south
lines of Township 26 South, Ranges 25 and 26 East. Exhibits
24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. Those maps were clearly erroneous.
Exhibit 96, dated 1881, clearly shows the parallel to be about
two-thirds of a mile north of the south lines of those two
townships. There is no evidence that anyone ever saw or
heard of those maps in either county prior to 1958.
Grand County makes the novel argument that five "old
maps" of Utah constitute proof that when the Legislature
created Grand County in 1890 and used Parallel 38 ° 30' North
Latitude as the county boundary it "intended" the south lines
of Township 26 South. Two of the maps are dated 1884 and
1889. By 1890 only the townships in Ranges 25 and 26 had
been surveyed, or a total of 8Vz miles east and west. Over 45
miles of township lines were unsurveyed, some of which were
not surveyed until 1954. It is admitted that all maps and plats
since 1925 prepared by the Bureau of Land Management and
the State Road Commission show 38 ° 30' North Latitude to be
about two-thirds of a mile north of the south lines of the
townships except at Ranges 25 and 26 East.
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Defendant attempts to change the plain wording of the
statute by some extrinsic evidence to show that the Legislature
in 1890 meant something other than what it plainly stated.
Grand County ignored the fact that by revisions of the statutes
in 1898 and 1933 the Legislature readopted 38° 30' North
Latitude as the boundary line, not some township line or lines.
This Court has announced the rule that legislative intent must
be taken from the words of the statute itself.
In Parkinson v. State Bank of Millard County, 84 Utah
278, 35 P. (2d) 814, at Page 821, this Court says:

" * * * Ordinarily the Legislature speaks only in
general terms. Its intention and meaning primarily
must be determined from language of the statute which
should be given a liberal interpretation. Words and
phrases are presumed to have been used according to
their plain, natural, and common import and usage
of the language, unless obviously used in a technical
sense. Such is the effect of our statute, Rev. St. 1933,
Sec. 88-2-11."
In Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah
619, 223 P. (2d) 586, at Page 590, the Court states:
"The primary purpose in construing statutes is to
arrive at the legislative intent within the framework
of the language used. * * * there is nothing indefinite
or uncertain about the words, rrlf an employer has
acquired all or substantially all the assets of another
employer and such employer had discontinued operations upon such acquisition, the period of liability of
both employers during such period shall be jointly considered for all purposes of this section.' We need not
restrict the meaning of this phrase by assuming a narrow
and rigid construction of the words. We accept them
in their every day usage . . "
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The statute which created San Juan County in 1880 used
Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude four years before any of the
"old maps" referred to by Grand County ever came into existence. In 1890 the Legislature again used that same parallel.
That parallel is a definite ascertainable boundary line. There
can be no resort to extrinsic evidence to speculate that the
Legislature might have meant something it did not say. In the
revisions of the statutes in 1898 and 1933 the original boundary
line was reenacted.
Grand County has maintained an airport which is admittedly located in both Grand .and San Juan Counties. It
is in both Grand and San Juan Counties, for it is in Townships
26 and 27 South. Because San Juan County quitclaimed to
Grand County the lands in Township 27 South, it is argued
in Appellant's Brief that San Juan County impliedly recognized
the south line of Township 26 South as the county boundary.
There can be no such implication. The deed clearly states that
the land is in San Juan County, and no county boundary is
mentioned. Exhibit 158 is a patent from the State of Utah
covering lands in the disputed area and to the north thereof,
in Section 36, which patent states that the lands are in San
Juan and Grand Counties.
Grand County cites Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503,
37 L. Ed. 537, 13 S. Ct. 728. That case is not in point for the
boundary line actually had been marked and established in
1803 and there was a compact between the two states approving
that line.

Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 34 L. Ed. 329, 10 S.
Ct. 1051, involved an uncertain boundary. The statute admitting
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Kentucky into the Union made the north side of the Ohio
River the state boundary. The river meanders and the courses
had changed. There was some uncertainty as to whether an
island in the river was actually within the river when Kentucky
became a state.
New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U. S. 30, 69 L. Ed. 499,
45 S. Ct. 202, cited on Page 24 of Appellant's Brief by the
wrong citation, does not support the contentions of Grand
County. The dispute arose over a U. S. Land Office survey
in conflict with a prior boundary survey. The Supreme Court
held that U. S. Land Office surveys cannot alter boundary lines
established by law.

(D) IT IS A CARDINAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE THAT A JUDGMENT RIGHT IN RESULT WILL NOT BE REVERSED MEREY BECAUSE
THE WRONG REASONS WERE STATED FOR ENTRY OF SUCH A JUDGMENT.
Regardless of the erroneous reason stated for dismissal of
the counterclaim, that the trial court was "without jurisdiction,"
the result was right and Grand County is not entitled to a
reversal of the judgment of dismissal of such counterclaim.
In Dayton Power & Light Co. v .Public Utilities Com., 292
U. S. 290, 78 L. Ed. 1267, 54 S. Ct. 647, the United States
Supreme Court said, "The appellant may not prevail unless
there has been error in the result as well as error in the reasoning." See also Rose Hill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 Ill. 11,
185 N. E. 170, 87 A.L.R. 742, and 3 Am. Jur., P. 37, Sec.
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825. "A decision right in result will not be reversed even

though the reason stated for it is wrong." 3 Am. Jur., P. 563.
The judgment dismissing the counterclaim was right because of a clear lack of any competent evidence, and for the
further reason that the. counterclaim was contrary to law, since
the county boundary line was fixed by statute and said line
is a definite ascertainable boundary line, and could not be shifted
by "acquiescence" to some jagged line never authorized nor
described by statute.
POINT 2.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING
THAT IT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DETER1'IINE THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE CASE, AND IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF.
San Juan County concurs with the contention of Grand
County that the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
the controversy between the two counties. San Juan County
takes the position that the counterclaim of Grand County was
properly dismissed, although for the wrong reason. San Juan
County takes the position that it was error to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, and that the District Court should have
granted judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance with Finding of Fact No. 3.
By Finding of Fact No.3 the Court found that the common
boundary line between Grand and San Juan Counties has been
established by the Territorial and State Legislatures and has
11
never varied and has always been described as Parallel 38° 30;
North Latitude."
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The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked by the
complaint of San Juan County to determine what is the common
boundary between the two counties "that is now established
by law." The complaint does not seek to have the court determine where the boundary is precisely located on the ground,
but what is the lawfully established boundary. The issue as to
what is the boundary established by law arises from the recent
contention made by Grand County to the effect that the boundary is not Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude as defined in the
statutes, but the south lines of Townships 26 South. It was
alleged that Grand County sought to exercise jurisdiction over
a strip of land between Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude on the
north and the south lines of Townships 26 South on the south,
called "the disputed area."
By answer Grand County admitted that it was claiming
jurisdiction over the strip of land called "the disputed area,"
and that it asserted a right to collect taxes on property lying
in the disputed area. Grand County alleged by its answer and
counterclaim that the boundary is not Parallel 38 o 30' North
Latitude, but a line coincident with the south lines of Townships 26 South. Thus even the answer and counterclaim show
there is a controversy as to what is the lawfully existing boundary line.
Article VIII, Seeton 7, Constitution of Utah, provides that
the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal not excepted by the Constitution and not
prohibited by law. Article I, Section 11, provides that "all
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
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by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay."
Our code specifically authorizes action by one county
against another county, Section 78-13-3, U.C.A. 1953:
"An action against a county may be commenced and
tried in such county, unless such action is brought by a
county, in which case it may be commenced and tried
in any county not a party thereto."
Whether or not the State Engineer finished the job of
surveying and monumenting the boundary line was not a fact
which could divest the trial court of jurisdiction, when Grand
County expressly admitted it was trying to exercise county
jurisdiction south of Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude, and that
Grand County would continue to do so until otherwise ordered
by the court. It was error for the trial court to dismiss the
complaint and refuse to give plaintiff judgment defining the
boundary as Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude.
POINT 3.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ENTER JUDGMENT THAT THE BOUNDARY LINE
BETWEEN SAN JUAN ANTI GRAND COUNTIES WAS
AND IS 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE AND THAT SUCH
BOUNDARY LINE NEVER HAS BEEN LAWFULLY
CHANGED.
The District Court appropriately made Findings of Fact
1, 2, 3 and 4 from the statutes and the admissions of Grand
County and the competent evidence. Having correctly found
that the common boundary "has never varried and has always
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been described as Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude," San Juan
County was and is entitled to have judgment rendered in accordance with those findings, inasmuch as Grand County
attempted to move the line from a half mile to two-thirds of
a mile southward to the south lines of Townships 26 South.
On page 42 of its brief, Grand County states under its
Point III:
"The Court should have determined as a matter of
law that 38 o 30' North Latitude, as historically marked
and monumented, is the common boundary line between the two counties and was what the Legislature
creating the counties intended as the true common
boundary between the counties."
San Juan County agrees with all of the quoted statement
except "as historically marked and monumented," for prior
to 1958 the parallel was not marked and monumented. On
page 31 Grand County states that ''The exact position of 38° 30'
North Latitude is still unmarked on the earth's surface," which
indicates that the parallel has never been marked and monumented. Judgment should be entered adjudging that the common boundary was and is 38° 30' North Latitude and that
said boundary line has never been changed to the south lines
of Townships 26 South nor to some other line.
Even if San Juan County were properly found not to be
entitled to all of the judicial relief it sought in bringing the
action, that would not warrant denial of all judicial relief. The
trial court should have entered judgment establishing the
statutory line of 38 ° 30' North Latitude and judgment that
such boundary line never has been legally changed, in order
"to determine the ultimate rights of the parties" as provided
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in Rule 54 (c) . Our Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate
that a party to an action shall be granted the relief to which
he is entitled.
POINT 4.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
COSTS TO DEFENDANT.
Inasmuch as the District Court properly dismissed the
counterclaim of Grand County, and inasmuch as San Juan
County was entitled to at least some judicial relief, it was error
to assess costs against San Juan County.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of dismissal of the counterclaim of Grand
County should be affirmed, inasmuch as Grand County attempted to annex about 35 square milse of San Juan County
without compliance with the constitutional requirements. The
judgment dismissing the complaint should be reversed and
judgment should be entered that 38 ° 30' North Latitude was
and is the county boundary line and that said boundary line
has never been lawfully changed to the south lines of Townships
26 South, nor to any other position at variance with the true
statutory line. San Juan County should recover its costs.
Respectfully submitted,
F. BENNION REDD
San Juan County Attorney
McKAY AND BURTON
By WILFORD M. BURTON and
PAUL E. REIMANN
Attorneys for San Juan County,
Plaintiff and Respondent and
Cross-Appellant
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